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The Trash Trade: Foreign Hazardous
Waste as an Object of Commerce in




According to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, "while many
[states] are willing to generate waste . .. few are willing to help
dispose of it."' This statement seems undeniably accurate in a
time when the volume of waste in the United States is increasing
dramatically and the disposal space is decreasing rapidly. 2 With
the demand for waste disposal sites growing, many states have
attempted to protect the interests of their own citizens and local
environment by closing their waste disposal sites to out-of-state
companies and residents through legislative acts.3 Consequently,
"the proliferation of legislation affecting garbage disposal is
more than merely potential. . . It is symptomatic of a pattern
in which Federal and State regulation has reduced the surface
area available for landfill use at one and the same time that
waste production burgeons. "4 To the dismay of many state
governments, courts have repeatedly deemed these statutes un-
constitutional due to their conflict with the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.'
* Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RsoURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., 1994, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1991, Transylvania University.
I Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan DONR, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2028 (1992) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2028.
See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (11th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
I Monroe-Livingston Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 435 N.Y.S.
2d 966, 970 (N.Y. 1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (holding New Jersey statute facially discriminated against waste origi-
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In keeping with this pattern of cases, the federal district
court in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet1 held the
Louisiana state statutes banning the importation of hazardous
waste unconstitutional, but this case is novel due to its unique
combination of factors: the origin of the waste is a foreign
country; the waste is hazardous; the court applies the law for
importation of domestic waste by analogy to foreign waste; the
court includes hazardous waste in its expansive view of com-
merce; and the statutes at issue implicate both interstate and
foreign commerce.' This Comment will examine the interesting
approach that Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet
advances in greater detail and will identify its unique place
among the growing trend of state waste disposal statutes that
challenge the Commerce Clause.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) 8 and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
of 1984 (HSWA)9 in response to its findings that "the problems
of waste disposal ... have become a matter national in scope
and in concern and necessitate federal action ... to reduce the
nating from outside the state); National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (l1th Cir. 1990) (holding Alabama statute
violated the Commerce Clause), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Browning-Ferris,
Inc. v. Anne Arundel County, 438 A.2d 269 (Md. 1981) (holding Maryland statutory
provision prohibiting disposal in and transportation through the county violated the
Commerce Clause).
6 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La.
1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993).
, Although an appellate decision affirming the district court's holding has been
issued (967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir, 1992)), this Comment will focus on the district court
decision (770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La. 1991)) due to the interesting and unique arguments
found therein. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied on the district
court's reasoning in affirming the lower court's decision.
S Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [hereinafter RCRAJ, Pub. L. No. 89-
272, title It, § 1002, as added Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2796, and amended
Pub. L. No. 95-609, § 7(a), 92 Stat. 3081; Pub. L. No. 98-616, title I, § 101(a), 98 Stat.
3224 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988)).
9 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 [hereinafter HSWA], 98 Stat.
3221 (1984). The HSWA are now codified throughout RCRA.
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amount of waste and unsalvageable materials and to provide for
proper and economical solid waste disposal practices."' 0 Con-
gress authorized "the Administrator [of the federal program],
after consultation with State authorities, [to] promulgate guide-
lines to assist States in the Development of State hazardous
waste programs."" The Act also provides that each state can
develop its own program as long as the Administrator approves
and only if the state program is "consistent with Federal [and]
State programs applicable in other States."' 2 As a result, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drafted the "Require-
ments for Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs,"
specifying the procedures the EPA will follow in approving and
rejecting state programs and presenting the requirements state
programs must meet to be approved by the administrator of the
RCRA program. 3 Those persons or companies "import[ing]
hazardous waste from a foreign country must [also] comply with
the requirements of [40 C.F.R. section 262],"' which include
notifying the "Regional Administrator in writing at least four
weeks in advance of the date the waste is expected to arrive at
the facility.'
B. Louisiana's Foreign-Generated Hazardous Waste Laws
Two Louisiana statutes 6 are at issue in Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Templet.'7 Title 30, section 2190 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes is entitled "Hazardous wastes from
foreign nations; findings; prohibitions" and asserts that the "laws
of foreign nations are inadequate to insure that hazardous wastes
sought to be exported to the United States do not contain
unknown or unauthorized pollutants" and are inadequate to
insure proper "containment, labeling, [and] handling during
transport."'" As a result, the legislature reasons that the "[tihe
10 RCRA § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988).
Id. at § 6926(a).
I ld. at § 6926(b).
13 40 C.F.R. § 271.2 (1992); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (authorizing state hazardous
waste programs).
14 40 C.F.R. § 262.60(a) (1992) (regarding importation of hazardous waste).
11 Id. at § 264.12(a) (regarding required notices).
16 LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190-2191 (West 1991).
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La.
1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nor. 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993).
1, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2190A(2) (West 1991).
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only practical method for insuring that the environment and the
health of the citizens of this state are not endangered . . . is to
prohibit the introduction or receipt of such [foreign] wastes into
this state for the purpose of treatment, storage, or disposal."' 9
This statute, thus, renders it illegal for any person or company
to allow waste from a foreign country to be imported into
Louisiana.?0
Title 30, section 2191 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes bears
the similar title of "Importation of hazardous waste from for-
eign countries; prohibition." '2' It stipulates that Louisiana will
"deny hazardous waste transporter licenses and hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facility permits to all persons
who propose to transport into and dispose of in Louisiana
[foreign] hazardous waste.''2 Both statutes, as part of Louisian-
a's state waste disposal program, were approved by the EPA
under the RCRA scheme.23
C. 1983 Mexico-United States Agreement to Cooperate in the
Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area
With Mexico's encouragement of foreign-owned industries
called "maquiladoras," industry in Mexico has increased dra-
matically over the past ten years.? "Maquiladoras" are com-
panies predominantly from the United States which are
encouraged to locate in Mexico to develop industry with the
incentive of no Mexican import taxes.25 But with this growth in
industry has come an expansion in the production of waste
materials.36 Through a series of agreements that culminated in
the 1983 Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environ-
I Id. at § 2190A(3).
Id. at § 2190B-C.
21 Id. at § 2191.
Id. at § 2191A.
2 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (M.D.
La. 1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993).
, Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Management Prob-
lems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 ItNr'L LAW. 223, 223-27 (1989).
25 Id. at 223; see also Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1144
n.3 (maquiladoras are allowed to import raw materials without paying Mexican import
taxes).
Z Rose, supra note 24, at 224.
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mental Problems in the Border Area2 7 , the United States and
Mexico have agreed "to coordinate their efforts, in conformity
with their own national legislation and existing bilateral agree-
ments to address problems of air, land and water pollution in
the border area.'"'2 As part of the agreement, "maquiladoras
are required to return unused goods and wastes to the country
of origin for final disposal." 2 9 The federal RCRA program
specifically provides for foreign hazardous waste to be imported
into the United States,30 directly conflicting with the Louisiana
statutes' complete prohibition.
II. SUMMARY OF Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Templet
In September 1989, Chemical Waste Management, Inc. (here-
inafter ChemWaste) advised the EPA of its decision to import
into Louisiana foreign hazardous waste produced in Mexico by
two maquiladoras.3' Because Louisiana bad an authorized state
waste disposal program under RCRA, the EPA directed
ChemWaste to notify the Louisiana Department of Environmen-
tal Quality (hereinafter LDEQ).3 2 The LDEQ, however, objected
to the importation of the Mexican hazardous waste on the basis
of the prohibition by two Louisiana statutes." In response,
ChemWaste filed an action against Paul Templet, Secretary of
the LDEQ, claiming inconsistency between the state and federal
hazardous waste programs and challenging the constitutionality
of the Louisiana statutes.34
Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environmental Problems in the
Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, Mex.-U.S, 22 I.L.M. 1025 [hereinafter Mex.-U.S. Agree-
ment]. Subsequent Annex provisions have been added to the Mex.-U.S. Agreement to
specifically address certain problems.
m Id. at art. 5.
19 Rose, supra note 24, at 228; see Annex III, Agreement to Cooperate in the
Solution of Environmental Problems in the Border Area, Jan. 29, 1987, Mex.-U.S., 26
I.L.M. 25 [hereinafter Annex III] (addressing transboundary shipment of hazardous
waste). 1
40 C.F.R. § 262.60 (1992) (stating that "[a]ny person who imports hazardous
waste from a foreign country into the United States must comply with the requirements
of [§ 262.60]").
11 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1145 (M.D. La. 1991),
aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
32 Id. at 1145.
" LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190-2191 (West 1991); Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1145.
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1144.
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Finding it unnecessary to determine whether the Louisiana
statutes were consistent with RCRA, the court instead focused
on the Commerce Clause issue in its opinion. 5 The court dis-
cussed two important areas of congressional power in commerce:
interstate commerce and foreign commerce. 6 Relying on an Elev-
enth Circuit decision, the court declared domestic hazardous
waste an object of commerce because "we cannot say that the
dangers of hazardous waste outweigh its worth in interstate
commerce." 37 The court in Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,
therefore, accepted hazardous waste as an object of interstate
commerce and extended the Eleventh Circuit's argument, assert-
ing that "the Court believes that the same principles and rea-
soning apply to the foreign generated hazardous waste involved
in this case."3
Applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court in City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,3 9 the court determined that the
Louisiana statutes violated the Interstate Commerce Clause by
burdening interstate commerce: "Where simple economic pro-
tectionism is effected by the state legislation, a virtually per se
rule of invalidity has been erected." 4 The court reasoned that
the state statutes "create an irrebuttable presumption concerning
the sufficiency of other nation's environmental laws ... based
solely on the origin of the hazardous waste," which renders the
statutes facially discriminatory . 4 Although the Louisiana legis-
lature only restricts foreign hazardous waste "imported into this
state directly from a foreign nation," it still burdens the flow
of interstate commerce because the LDEQ misapplies the sta-
tutes, by restricting the flow of commerce between Texas and
Louisiana. 42
The Louisiana statutes also violate the Foreign Commerce
Clause because "[a]lthough the Congress's regulatory power over
3' Id. at 1147. The court simply stated, without reason, that it was unnecessary to
go beyond the Commerce Clause analysis to hold the statutes unconstitutional. No
further explanation for not addressing the inconsistency was given, id.
Id. at 1147-53.
3 Id. at 1148-49 (citing National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama
Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 719 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S.
Ct. 2800 (1991)).
3i Id.
" City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
I d. at 1149 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
11 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1150.
41 Id. at 1150-51; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2190(D) (West 1991).
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interstate commerce may be limited by federalism and state
sovereignty, the Supreme Court has not held that such limita-
tions apply to the Congress's power to regulate foreign com-
merce. '43 With foreign commerce, the court stipulated that it
was vitally important that the United States promote a unified
foreign policy rather than causing confusion and conflict with
fifty independent foreign policies. 44
The court further asserted its power to declare the statutes
unconstitutional because "it is for the courts, and not an exec-
utive or legislative body, to determine the constitutionality of
the statutes involved in this case." 45 The EPA represents an
administrative agency, not a court that determines constitutional
issues. 46 In addition, Congress has already authorized the im-
portation of hazardous waste under its RCRA regulations, and
a state's program must remain consistent with federal guidelines
and other state programs 7.4  Because the Louisiana statutes vio-
late both interstate and foreign commerce, the court issued a
permanent injunction enjoining the LDEQ from enforcing the
statutes.48
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE CHALLENGES
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
declares that "Congress shall have [the] Power ... [tJo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes." 49 According to the Supreme Court,
"[ilt has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only
[affirmatively] grants Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce among the States, but also directly limits the power of
the States to discriminate against interstate commerce." 50 These
"negative implications of the clause have been referred to as the
41 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
" Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
4'Id.
RCRA, § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988); Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,
770 F. Supp. at 1153; see also 40 C.F.R. § 262.60 (1991).
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1153.
41 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
11 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
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'dormant' or 'negative' commerce clause .... [and] apply with
equal force to all laws and regulations that affect interstate
commerce.""1 The Supreme Court has also recognized this dor-
mant aspect as applying to foreign commerce "as a self-executing
limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing
substantial burdens" on interstate or foreign commerce. 2 The
main goal of the dormant Commerce Clause is to "prohibit[]
economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures designed
to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors."" By preventing economic protectionism, the United
States gains a sense of solidarity as a unified nation rather than
merely existing as a loose confederacy of independent states.
4
In recognizing the limit that the Commerce Clause places on the
States, the Supreme Court "consistently has distinguished be-
tween out-right protectionism and more indirect burdens on the
free flow of trade"" in state legislation. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey sets out the standard test for facial discrimination:
"[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.' '36
The Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, on the other hand,
presents a balancing test for those statutes that appear facially
neutral: "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate
a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burder
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. ' ' 7 These tests reflect the context in which
11 County Comm'rs v. Stevens, 473 A.2d 12, 14 (Md. 1984); see Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (holding that the Court must first ask if the
state law burdens commerce and then ask if Congress has preempted the State from
legislating at all); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (recognizing :hat the
Commerce Clause gives Congress power to act and prevents the States from legislating);
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-538 (1948) (pointing out that
the States can legislate for internal health and safety but cannot legislate commerce
because that is a congressional power).
52 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984).
5 New Energy Co. of Ind., 486 U.S. at 273-74; see also Lewis, 447 US. at 35
(stating that the Supreme Court has long recognized that the Commerce Clause limits
the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade).
, See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 535; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (condemning the use of economic restraints on interstate
commerce as a means of advancing local economic advantages).
Lewis, 447 U.S. at 36.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. 525.
11 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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the Chemical Waste Management, Inc. Court reached its deci-
sion.
B. Hazardous Waste as an Object of Interstate Commerce
According to City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, "[a]ll
objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection;
none is excluded by definition at the outset.""' In that case, the
Supreme Court held that "U]ust as Congress has power to
regulate the interstate movement of [nonhazardous] wastes, States
are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that
movement."' 9 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, however, only
addresses nonhazardous waste and suggests that states could
prohibit importation if "the articles' worth in interstate com-
merce was far outweighed by the dangers inhering in their very
movement."° Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
"we cannot say that the dangers of hazardous waste outweigh
its worth in interstate commerce" and declared hazardous waste
an object of commerce. 61 As the Fifth Circuit Court noted on
appeal62, the Supreme Court has recently supported this view by
declaring hazardous waste to be an object of commerce and
worthy of protection in Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan
DONR.61 In that case, the Court held that it was unconstitutional
to make the disposal of waste generated in another county, state,
or country contingent upon express authorization by a county's
plan."
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet extends the
Eleventh Circuit decision concerning interstate commerce to for-
eign commerce because "the same principles and reasoning apply
to the foreign generated hazardous waste ... [and] the same
type of hazardous waste is already being transported into and
disposed of in Louisiana" by plants located in the United States.
65
" City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 622.
19 Id. at 622-23.
" Id. at 622.
61 National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Manage-
ment Ass'n, 910 F.2d 713, 719 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
*Z Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 967 F.2d 1058, 1059 (5th Cir.
1992), aff'g 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D. La. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993).
6 Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan DONR, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2023 (1992).
" Id. at 2024.
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 (M.D.
La. 1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048
(1993).
1992-93]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
The court, thus, reaches the conclusion that "the foreign gen-
erated hazardous waste involved in this case is an object of
commerce and subject to the protection of the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution.'' Consequently, constitu-
tional protection has been extended to foreign-generated hazard-
ous waste, broadening the definition of hazardous waste as
commerce.
C. The Interstate Commerce Clause Challenge
The court in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet
adopts the test employed in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey
5 7
to determine if title 30, sections 2190 and 2191 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutess are permissible under the Commerce Clause.
Because "[tihe statutes enacted by the Louisiana legislature cre-
ate an irrebuttable presumption concerning the sufficiency of
other nation's environmental laws," the statutes facially discrim-
inate against interstate commerce.7 0 In previous cases involving
per se discrimination against interstate commerce, the analysis
centered around statutes that blatantly facially discriminate
against other states.71 In this case, by contrast, the discrimination
only appears to affect a foreign country. 2 The court extends
"the legal principles ... involving domestic waste [to] also apply
when a state limits movement based on the origin of the haz-
ardous waste even if the origin is a foreign country. '7 3 Moreo-
ver, the court claims discrimination exists against Texas, in
effect, because sections 2190 and 2191 "restrict the flow of
commerce from Texas to Louisiana. ' 4 Despite the legislature's
prohibition against only hazardous waste "imported into this
state directly from a foreign nation,"7 the LDEQ uses this
statute to prevent waste transported from Mexico through Texas
to enter Louisiana. In this manner, "the LDEQ has misapplied
I Id. at 1149.
67 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190-2191 (West 1991).
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1149.
,0 Id. at 1150.
' See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988); City of Phila-
delphia. 437 U.S. 617.
72 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2190-2191 (West 1991).
"1 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1152.
1 Id. at 1151.
" LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2190(D) (West 1991) (emphasis added).
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the statutes, causing them to be unconstitutional 'as applied.' ' ' 6
Through this reasoning, the court seems to adopt the Pike test
for statutes that appear to regulate in an evenhanded way but
discriminate in effect. 77 Discrimination occurs because "Texas
environmental laws concerning transportation [of hazardous
waste] apply whether the waste is properly categorized as 'di-
rectly' or 'indirectly' imported." 7  However, the court relies on
per se discrimination, rather than on the balancing test, by
drawing an analogy between domestic and foreign hazardous
waste in order to hold sections 2190 and 2191 unconstitutional.
79
The court can, in this manner, hold the statutes unconstitutional
for all times because they are discriminatory on their face, not
just discriminatory "as misapplied."8 0 By employing this testing
method, the court appears to be anticipating future litigation
about other "applications" and thwarting these arguments be-
fore they arise.
The court rejects LDEQ's "quarantine power" defense be-
cause LDEQ bases its discrimination on origin rather than the
type of hazardous waste.8 Although the true objective of the
Louisiana legislature may be to protect the health and welfare
of its citizens and environment, "the evil of protectionism can
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends." '8 2 The
Eleventh Circuit expanded this theory to apply to protectionism
in the form of statutes banning hazardous waste based solely on
its out-of-state origin. 83 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Templet further extends this doctrine to apply to foreign origins
as well as domestic out-of-state originsA8 Unlike Maine v. Tay-
lor, where the Supreme Court determined that banning the im-
portation of fish and wildlife was the least discriminatory means
"6 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1151.
" Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1151.
" Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1151-52.
*' Id. at 1151-52. Quarantine powers enable the States to enact legislation aimed
at protecting the health of its citizens and the environment. However, mere pretext of
such purpose is not sufficient. Here, the court actually found Louisiana to have discrim-
ination as its purpose, id.
City of JPhiladelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
" National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Manage-
ment, 910 F.2d 713 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991).
' Chemical Waste Management. Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1151.
1992-931
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to prevent parasites," less discriminatory means exist here for
protecting state citizens and the environment, such as prohibiting
certain types of hazardous waste that are found in both domestic
and foreign waste imports. At first glance, it would seem that
the court should defer to legislative judgment concerning the
means of protecting its citizens and environment, as the Louis-
iana legislature would be in a better position than the court in
making this determination. However, the blatant purpose of this
statute is to discriminate, not to protect its citizens; the court
will not defer to biased legislative judgments. Although the
LDEQ argues that the statutes prohibit waste based on "lack of
adequate controls by foreign nations," 8 6 their argument fails due
to the fact that "Louisiana's ban is based on the origin of the
hazardous waste, rather than the specific type ... [and] [t]he
Louisiana legislature did not provide any exceptions to the ab-
solute ban of foreign generated hazardous waste. 8 7 This court's
reasoning, thus, brings a seemingly foreign commerce issue into
the realm of interstate commerce analysis.
D. The Foreign Commerce Clause Challenge
In addition to burdening interstate commerce, sections 2190
and 2191 also violate the Foreign Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 8 This issue brings a new analysis to
cases dealing with state waste statutes and Commerce Clause
conflict because prior cases only involved interstate commerce
challenges. 89 The Supreme Court advocates that "the Federal
Government must speak with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments.' ' Consequently,
"[the need for federal uniformity is no less paramount in as-
certaining the negative implications of Congress' power to 'reg-
11 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding Maine statute that made it a
federal crime to import fish or wildlife in violation of state law because the statute had
a legitimate and substantial purpose in preventing parasites and there were no less
discriminatory means available).
' Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1152.
Id. at 1152.
u Id. at 1152-53; see generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress
has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations).
See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
0 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976).
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ulate Commerce with foreign Nations' under the Commerce
Clause." 9' Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet ad-
vocates "Congress's plenary power to regulate foreign com-
merce,"' 2 and many cases readily support this proposition. 93 The
Supreme Court proclaims that the foreign commerce power "is
exclusive and plenary .... [and] its exercise may not be limited,
qualified or impeded to any extent by state action.'"'
From the Supreme Court decision in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, a two-part test has developed for deter-
mining the validity of state statutes affecting foreign commerce:
the statutes "are invalid if they (1) create a substantial risk of
conflicts with foreign governments, or (2) undermine the ability
of the federal government to 'speak with one voice' in regulating
commercial affairs with foreign states." 95 Both RCRA9 and the
Mexico-U.S. Agreement9 ' permit the importation of hazardous
waste generated by maquiladoras. Denying importation of this
hazardous waste would directly conflict with American and Mex-
ican policies. 98 In addition, it would lead to each state establish-
ing its own foreign policy and would create a conflict among
states, as occurred with Texas and Louisiana." Accordingly,
"[tihe control of importation does not rest with the State but
with the Congress.' "1 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Templet, therefore, appears to be consistent with prevailing views
of foreign commerce policy.'0'
91 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1152.
0 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1933)
(stating that Congress' foreign commerce power is plenary); Louisiana Land & Explo-
ration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 819 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 248 (1990) (stating that "the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments").
" Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 56-57 (emphasis added).
" New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor, & Terminal Dist., 874
F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2172 (1990) (citing Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979)).
40 C.F.R. § 262.60 (1992) (authorizing imports of hazardous waste).
Annex Ill, supra note 29. Annex III specifies which hazardous wastes must be
readmitted into the exporting country and is comparable to the RCRA export provisions.
- 40 C.F.R. § 262.60 (providing for the importation of hazardous waste); Mex.-
U.S. Agreement, supra note 27 ("[recognizing that the close trading relationship and
the long common border between [the U.S. and Mexico] make it necessary to cooperate
regarding the transboundary shipments of hazardous waste").
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1151.
'B Ed. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 289 U.S. at 59.
101 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
1992-93]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
E. The Power to Determine Constitutionality
The court in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet
makes a definite point of declaring "it is for the courts, and
not an executive or legislative body, to determine the constitu-
tionality of the statutes involved in this case." 02 This declaration
refutes Louisiana's argument that the state statutes must auto-
matically be valid as part of the EPA-authorized state program.
The court asserts that "approval by the EPA does not constitute
a declaration that the state's program is constitutional or that
such approval is binding on the courts or precludes the courts
from determining the constitutionality of the statutes."''0 3 In
previous cases dealing with the relation between state waste
disposal statutes and the Commerce Clause, the power to declare
statutes unconstitutional was not addressed in this manner.104
Although the federal district court in this case emphatically
claims this power, it does so only by vaguely invoking the
Supremacy Clause rather than by explaining the basis for its
determination. 03 On appeal, the circuit court helps to clarify the
reasons behind this correct assertion of authority. 106 The appel-
late court refutes Louisiana's argument that authorization by the
EPA "render[s] the challenged statutes an exercise of Congress'
commerce power rather than an affront to it"107 by relying on
two cases. Focusing on South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, the court asserts that states can only legislatively
discriminate against interstate commerce if there exists an "un-
mistakably clear . . . expression of approval by Congress."'0 8 In
the case at hand, neither the district nor the circuit court believed
that mere EPA authorization of a state program was evidence
of approval to burden interstate commerce. ' 9 To reinforce its
decision, the circuit court also depends on a Fourth Circuit case
102 Id. at 1153.
1o Id.
104 See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Management, 910 F.2d 713 (1 1th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2800 (1991)..
0 Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1153.
0 Chemical Waste Management v. Templet, 967 F.2d 1058, 1058 (5th Cir. Aug.
10, 1992), aff'g 770 F. Supp. 1142 (1991), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
Id. at 1058.




1992-93] FOREIGN HAzARDous WASTE
to indicate that clear, unmistakable evidence must be presented
to demonstrate 'congressional intent to permit states to burden
interstate commerce' in the RCRA."1 0 This high standard of
proof definitely limits the opportunity for future litigation con-
cerning congressional intent in the area of state waste disposal
programs. In this case, no such intent could be derived from a
state program that clearly "deviate[d] below RCRA's minimum




Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet on one hand
appears to pit industry against the environment but, on the other
hand, seems to insulate interstate and foreign commerce from
economic protectionism."' It fits into the well-established pattern
of cases involving state statutes that unconstitutionally attempt
to isolate a state from the rest of the nation.14 Given the history
of declaring these statutes unconstitutional, the decision reached
in this case is far from surprising."' However, this case extends
laws governing solid waste and interstate commerce to foreign
hazardous waste, increasing the negative implications on state
regulation of commerce."
6
Recent Supreme Court decisions point to the growing trend
of declaring unconstitutional state statutes that ban the impor-
tation of waste." 7 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,
for example, affirms hazardous waste as an object of commerce:
Id. (citing Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945 F.2d
781 (1991)).
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 770 F. Supp. at 1147.
RCRA, §1002 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b)).
Id. at 1142.
" See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1948).
" See cases cited supra note 114.
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142, 1148-49
(M.D. La. 1991), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. 113 S. Ct.
1048 (1993).
I' See Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan DONR, 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992) (holding
unconstitutional a county statute that prohibited the importation of solid waste from
another county, state or country unless expressly authorized); Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (holding unconstitutional an Alabama act
that charged an additional fee to dispose of hazardous waste generated outside Alabama).
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
hazardous waste "is simply a grade of solid waste ... [involved
in] 'commercial transactions [that] unquestionably have an in-
terstate character.""' 8 Although a case about taxes rather than
waste importation, Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of
Revenue advances the proposition that "a State's preference for
domestic commerce over foreign commerce is inconsistent with
the Commerce Clause even if the State's own economy is not a
direct beneficiary of the discrimination. ' 1 9 Both of these Su-
preme Court cases demonstrate the likelihood that the Supreme
Court would uphold the decision of Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Templet.120 For now, states, such as Louisiana, are
still faced with locating that acceptable, but apparently non-
existent, balance between protection of their citizens and envi-
ronment and regulation of interstate and foreign commerce.
" Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-13 n.3 (1992)
(citing Fort Gratiot Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2023).
"I Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. 2365 (1992)
(holding that an Iowa statute discriminated against dividends received from foreign
subsidiaries because they were included in taxable income while dividends received from
domestic subsidiaries were not).
"I But see Fort Gratiot Landfill, 112 S. Ct. at 2030-31 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that permitting interstate transportation of waste encourages "each State to
ignore the waste problem in the hope that another will pick up the slack").
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